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Abstract
This paper analysis zero-rating, a practice where Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) ex-
clude some traffic from being charged when consumers use mobile broadband data. Focusing
on the downstream effects and considering two competing firms, two contents and network ef-
fects (externality) on one of the contents, it is shown that zero-rating can be used to increase,
and thereafter, extract more surplus from consumers, when network effects are strong enough.
Moreover, it is shown that the interaction between contents has an impact on investment deci-
sions, as substitutes contents lead to lower investment when the network effect increases while
complementary contents result in higher investment for stronger network effects. Finally, zero-
rating can lead to higher network capacity than under joint billing, when investment costs are
high enough.
Keywords: Zero-rating, network effects, capacity constraints.
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I Introduction
Recent years have brought many changes to mobile internet usage, both in terms of contents and
services available and amount of data transferred. Nonetheless, this has caused mobile network
operators (MNOs) to face an ever-increasing demand for data that they have been trying to match
with capacity investment. In addition, online services such as WhatsApp or Skype are reducing de-
mand for traditional mobile services (i.e. SMSs and calls), leading to a decrease in MNOs’ revenue
through two sources: the usage of such services and termination rates. Therefore, there is a de-
coupling between the revenue streams from provision of content and ownership of the network, as
pointed out by Baldry et al. (2014). This decoupling results in uncertainty over revenue generation
for MNOs, driving lower incentives to invest in capacity.
MNOs have been implementing network management practices in order to overcome the in-
creased uncertainty over revenue generation. One of the most recent is zero rating, in which traffic
generated by specific apps or websites is exempt from any usage charges. With such schemes,
MNOs expect to increase consumer surplus from subsidizing certain applications and/or online ser-
vices and charge them accordingly, increasing revenues and thus, getting higher returns on their
capacity investments. In fact, this is the main argument used by MNOs to justify zero-rating prac-
tises.
Much of the discussion on this topic deals with the content discrimination provoked by zero
rating as a violation of net neutrality rules, and its impact on the content market (upstream market),
namely, on the harmful effects that it has on competition among content providers. However, it is
also important to assess the impact of zero rating on the downstream market. While there have been
some studies on this,1 they focus on a monopolist MNO in different settings. As such, the focus
of this paper will be in a competitive setting, with homogeneous consumers and network effects on
one of the contents, and the main goal is to analyse how capacity investment is affected by zero
1As discussed in section II.
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rating under competition.
The paper is organized as follows: section II will discuss related literature; section III will
describe the framework to be used in the analysis; section IV will analyse the impacts on investment
incentives; section V present the case of a monopolist; and section VI concludes.
II Literature Review
This paper relates most to those analysing zero rating practices. As mentioned before, most of
the literature focuses on upstream effects of zero rating. As an example, Jullien et al. (2016) anal-
yse how MNOs can use data sponsorship plans to increase revenues. Nonetheless, the European
Commission (2014) reports that there is little evidence of such deals being struck as well as the
limited number of related complaints. In addition, van Schewick (2015) argues that zero-rating is
potentially a violation of net neutrality.
Some papers take a closer look at the downstream effects, and more specifically, at investment
incentives. For instance, Somogyi et al. (2017) uses a monopolist MNO facing a two-sided mar-
ket with homogeneous consumers and two competing content providers to show that zero rating
can be optimal if contents are very unattractive or very attractive, but not in an intermediate re-
gion. The subsequent impact on welfare is either negative for unattractive content or positive for
attractive content. Moreover, Preta and Peng (2015) find that, while zero-rating could have anti-
competitive consequences, they reckon that it is potentially welfare enhancing based on network
effects, price discrimination, two-sided market and behavioural economics explanations. Along
with this, Eisenach (2015) also describes the economic foundations of zero-rating and its concerns,
and concludes that zero-rating is a mechanism to capture economic efficiencies, while rejecting it
as an anti-competitive strategy.
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Inceoglu and Liu (2017) look at a monopolist MNO facing heterogeneous consumers, and show
that zero rating can be used as a price discrimination tool to better differentiate between consumer
types. They found that generally, zero rating can increase welfare if contents are not close sub-
stitutes and preferences are sufficiently different. More interestingly, they found that zero rate in-
creases capacity investment, if costs are not too high. This paper also contributes to the discussion
on net neutrality, for which Greenstein et al. (2016) summarizes the main findings and arguments
used in the debate.
More generally, I consider Hotelling competition with capacity constraints, which was previ-
ously looked at by Wauthy et al. (1996), where he showed that capacity constraints may restore
the existence of equilibrium with pure strategies when products are too similar. The intuition of
this paper is that when products are similar, firms have incentives to undercut each others prices to
grab the whole market (similar to what happens in Bertrand competition), however the existence
of capacity constraints means that firms cannot serve the whole market and therefore, incentives to
undercut prices disappear once capacity is reached.
III Framework
To analyse investment decisions under zero rating, the following setting is proposed: there are
two contents x and y, accessible through an internet service provided by one of two competing
operators. Operators charge a fixed fee F and provide consumers with a data cap (allowance of
data) q, which cannot exceed the per consumer capacity allocation k. The latter is a function of
capacity Q and the number of consumers N the MNO wants to serve, such that k = Q
N
. Firms have
constant marginal cost c of investing in capacity, but using capacity is costless. Moreover, I assume
that there is a positive network effect on content x, that is, the more x is consumed, the better off
consumers are. This means that if there is an incentive to zero rate, it must be on content x and both
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firms will want to do it.
III.A Model Setup
In this setting, I have a mass 1 of consumers with homogeneous preferences over contents ob-
tained via a mobile broadband connection. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is satiation in
consumption of both contents, i.e. marginal utility of consumption goes to zero. This is specially
important under zero rating where one of the contents will be unconstrained. Without this as-
sumption, optimal consumption of x would be infinite without an additional constraint (i.e. time
constraint), which would add unnecessary complications to the model and subsequent analysis.
Consumers choice of network is modelled below. For a given choice of network, the utility func-
tion, for a consumer n, used for the analysis is:






y2n − γxnyn + βX,
where γ ∈ ]−1, 1[ is a parameter for the interaction between contents
β > 0 is a parameter for the strength of the network effect
X represents total use of content x on the network that consumer n connected to.
For values of γ > 0 contents are substitutes, whereas for values of γ < 0 contents are comple-
ments. Moreover, consumers, when maximizing utility over contents (not network choice), do not
take into account the externality, which creates inefficiency in consumption.
Consumers face a usage constraint y+λrx ≤ q imposed by the MNO, where r is an exogenous
parameter that measures how much bandwidth is used per unit of x relative to y (which has band-
width usage normalized to 1). In this model, bandwidth reflects the implicit price of consuming
content, i.e. how much data is displaced by consuming either x or y. λ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter for
how MNOs "price"2 content x. For λ = 1 consumption of x counts towards the cap (henceforth,
2Note that content y will always have λy = 1.
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referred to as joint billing) and for λ = 0 the content is said to be zero rated (consumption of x does
not count towards the data cap). For any other value, there is partial billing; however I will only
focus on joint billing vs. zero rating.
The consumer maximization problem is then:
max
x,y




y2 − γxy (1)
s.t. y + λrx ≤ q. (2)
As mentioned before, this model deals with two firms (MNOs). Given their market share α,
profit functions are πi = αFi − cQi subject to Qi = αki. Firms set capacity Qi, fixed fee Fi and
do not charge for usage, as marginal costs of using capacity is zero and the data cap ensures that
consumption does not exceed capacity. The per consumer capacity allocation follows implicitly
from the fixed fee and the resulting market share.
Similar to what is done in Laffont et al. (1998), competition occurs on a Hotelling line [0,1],
where each firm is located at one end of the line and consumers are distributed through the line.
Their position p on the line reflects their preferential network characteristics and pi represents firms’
locations. Consumers get surplus Si(ki) from connecting to network i and have a cost t from not
connecting to their preferential network. Given their position p, capacity allocated to them ki and
fixed fee Fi, consumers get utility from connecting to network i:
Si(ki)− Fi − t|p− pi|.
Let wi = Si(ki) − Fi be the consumers’ net utility from connecting to network i. A consumer
located at distance α from firm i is indifferent between networks if:
wi − tα = wj − t(1− α).
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(wi − wj). (3)
Decisions are taken in the following order: firstly, firms choose capacity; then, firms decide
fixed fees and whether to zero rate consumption of content x or not; consumers then choose which
network they are connecting to; and finally, consumers choose how much of contents x and y they
will consume. I find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
III.B Consumer Choice and Market Equilibrium
III.B.1 Consumers’ Decision
First I look at the optimal consumption levels of x and y for a given choice of network. However, as
mentioned before, the utility function considered has a satiation point. As such, consumer choice
has to be analysed under a binding and non-binding cap.
Non-binding cap For large enough data caps, consumption becomes unconstrained (equivalent













Total consumption is rx+y = 1+r
1+γ
≡ K and consumption that counts towards the cap is λrx+y =
1+rλ
1+r
. Thus, for any q ≥ 1+rλ
1+r
, the cap is non-binding.
Binding cap Let y + λrx = q, thus y = q − λrx. Consumers maximize surplus3 U(x, q − λrx)
resulting in x = 1−qγ−rλ+qrλ
1+r2λ2−2rλγ .
3 ∂2U
∂x2 = −1− r
2λ2 + 2rλγ < 0 is true since γ < 1.
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With this, it is possible to write q as a function of per costumer capacity usage k, by solving
rx+ q − λrx = k for q:
q =
1 + r2λ2 − 2rλγ
1− rλγ − rγ + r2λ
k +
−r2λ2 + rλ+ r2λ− r
1− rλγ − rγ + r2λ
. (4)
One would expect that q be increasing in k. A sufficient condition for this is 1− rγ > 0⇔ rγ < 1,
which is assumed henceforth.4
Moreover, in the remainder of the paper it is assumed that the cap is binding. Without this
assumption, zero rating would not have any impact on consumption decisions.
III.B.2 Firms’ Decision
Since firms charge a two part tariff, where the usage price is zero due to zero marginal costs, and
network effects are limited to each network, the choice of zero-rating can be decoupled from the
choice of fixed fees. Thus, the choice of zero-rating is analysed first, and fixed fees and equilibrium
market shares are determined subsequently.
Conditions for Zero Rating Firms are aware of the network effects, thus their profit maximiza-
tion problem takes into account the changes in consumer surplus that are due to this. By increasing
the surplus, firms expect to be able to capture it with higher fixed fees and/or end up with higher
market share. As such, in a first step, firm i maximizes surplus from consumption only consid-
ering λ as a decision variable. Since consumers have homogeneous preferences over contents,








y2 − γxy + βNx. (5)
4rγ < 1⇒ 1− rλγ − rγ + r2λ, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
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The surplus maximizing λ can be found as:
λ =
r −Nβ − rγ − r2γ − kr + r2 + krγ2 +Nrβγ
r − rγ − r2γ − kr + r2 +Nr2β + krγ2 −Nrβγ
. (6)
We have a maximum5 at λ = 0 when β = r(1−γ2) K−k
N(1−rγ) ≡ β
∗. For β > β∗, λ = 0 is a boundary
maximum.
Proposition 1 Zero-rating is optimal if network effects are strong enough, i.e. βN ≥ r 1−γ2
1−rγ (K −
k).
At λ = 0 (zero rating), the cap becomes q = k−r














(K − k)2 .
To have positive consumption6 it must be that k − r ≥ 0 ⇒ k ≥ r and 1 − γk ≥ 0 ⇒ k ≤ 1
γ
.
Notice however that this last condition is trivial since k ≤ K is needed and that K ≤ 1
γ
is always
true when rγ < 1. Thus the interval for eligible values of k is:
r ≤ k ≤ K,
which is non-empty since r < K when rγ < 1.
For simplicity I will use B = 1
1+γ
and A = 1−γ
2
2(1−rγ) such that surplus becomes:
Szr(k) = B − A(K − k)2 + βNx∗zr. (7)
5SOC: ∂
2S(x,y,X)
∂λ2 < 0 when 1− 2rγ + r
2 > 0.
6Recall that rγ < 1 is needed to sustain zero rating.
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Analogously, at λ = 1 (joint billing), the cap is q = k and maximization of surplus yields:
y∗jb =
k − r + r2 − kγr
r2 − 2rγ + 1
, x∗jb =
1− r − kγ + kr









2(1− 2rγ + r2)
(K − k)2 .
In this case, it is necessary that 1 − r − kγ + kr ≥ 0 ⇒ k ≤ 1−r
γ−r and k − r − r
2 − kγr ≥
0⇒ k ≥ r 1−r
1−γr . However, k ≤
1−r










≤ k ≤ K.
Furthermore, for γ < 1⇒ r 1−r
1−γr < r, hence the analysis can be restricted to k ≥ r without further
issues.
Letting G = 1−γ
2
2(1−2rγ+r2) , surplus is:
Sjb(k) = B −G(K − k)2 + βx∗jb. (8)




πi = α (Si(ki)− wi)− cQi
s.t. Qi = αki
(3).
(9)
















7See appendix A for computations.
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Substituting back the analogous firm j’s reaction function and replacing wi = Si(ki) − Fi, the

























kj , both affecting
positively the fixed fee. It can be argued that beyond the direct effect that ki and kj have on con-
sumers’ utility (which are the same as in the standard Hotelling model), increasing the capacity per
costumer restricts the amount of consumers the firm can supply, therefore the new "last" consumer
is closer to the firm (in the Hotelling line) and thus willing to pay more than the previous "last" con-
sumer, resulting in higher fixed fee. Conversely, if the other firm increases capacity per customer,
then it restricts the amount of consumers it can serve, increasing the market power of the original
firm over a bigger segment of the Hotelling line, also resulting in higher fixed fees.


























Replacing ki = Qiα and kj =
Qj
1−α , given by the original constraints, in the firm’s maximization
problem results in a 5th order equation in α, which cannot be solved analytically, as demonstrated
by Abel (1824). Hence, in order to solve the model it is necessary to look for a symmetric equi-
librium in capacities Qi. Namely, if it is considered that investment costs are the same for both
firms, then in equilibrium they will invest the same amount as well as provide the same data cap
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and charge the same fixed fee, resulting in α = 1
2
. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that k
is bounded, therefore, there will also be bounds on c that can be considered for the analysis. Hence,
the analysis will be done for values of r < k < K or equivalently r
2
< Q < K
2
.
Letting b = β
1−rγ and v =
β
r2−2rγ+1 , firm i’s profit functions become:
πzri = α
(





B −G(K − ki)2 + αv(1− γki − r + rki)− wi
)
− cQi, (14)
for zero-rating and joint billing, respectively. Still holding capacities Qi and Qj constant, solving
the model using the approach described in section III.B.2 yields equilibrium fixed fees:
F zri = −2Ak21 + 2AKk1 + α (2t− b) , (15)
F jbi = −2Gk21 + 2GKk1 + α ((r − 1)v + 2t) . (16)
Replacing equations (15), (16) and αki = Qi in the firms’ profit function αFi − cQi, it is possible








for zero-rating and joint billing, respectively. The curves cannot be compared analytically, there-
fore, I will set parameter values that allow for such comparison. Using parameter values γ = 0.5,
r = 0.5, β = 0.18 and t = 2 investment curves are:
8See appendix A for derivation.
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Figure 1: Investment curves with parameters: γ = 0.5, r = 0.5, β = 0.18
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
with solid and dashed lines representing investment decision under joint billing and zero rating,
respectively.
For the proposed parameter values, one quickly concludes that there is a region where invest-
ment in capacity will be lower under zero rating, namely when investment costs are low enough.
This means that the MNOs’ argument that zero rating increases capacity investment is not clear and
unconditional.
One important result is the impact that the interaction between contents has on the investment
decisions. While the sign of γ has no impact on the result stated above, it does influence how
MNOs react to changes in the strength of network effects. In the case of zero-rating, for γ > 0
(substitute contents), increasing the strength of the network effect β reduces the incentives to invest




1−rγ it is evident that for substitute contents, increased
strength of network effect reduces the marginal benefit of increasing ki and, implicitly, increasing
Qi. On the other hand, if contents are instead complements (i.e. γ < 0) the opposite is true.10 The
9See Figure 3 in appendix B for investment decisions with stronger network effects.
10See figures 4 and 5 in appendix B for an example of this.
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Proposition 2 Increasing the strength of the network effect: (i) increases the incentives to invest in
capacity if contents are complements; (ii) decreases incentives to invest if contents are substitutes.
V Monopoly case
To see the effects of competition on investment decisions, it is important to have the monopolist case
as a benchmark. As such, the same model is derived without firm j. The consumer with location
p = α is now indifferent between opting to join the network or not when S(ki) − Fi − tα = 0,
where 0 is the reservation utility (outside option). For simplicity, I look at the case where profits are




πi = U(Qi) + βx
∗ − t− cQi. (19)













−2rγ + r2 + 1
Q+
r − γ
−2rγ + r2 + 1
β +
1− γ + r − rγ
−2rγ + r2 + 1
, (21)
for the zero rating and joint billing case, respectively. It is evident that the negative effect of
increasing the strength of the network effect still persists in the zero rating case, and for joint
billing when γ > r. The effect that should be highlighted is that increased capacity has a negative
impact on the consumption of x when γ > 0, which leads to lower marginal benefit of increasing
capacity and therefore, less incentives to invest in capacity. Conversely, when γ < 0, the incentives
to invest increase with the strength of the network, meaning that Proposition 2 still holds in the
monopoly case. However, the effect of increasing the strength of the network effect is always more
positive for the joint billing case, as −γ
(1−rγ) <
r−γ
−2rγ+r2+1 for any γ ∈ ]−1, 1[.
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Again, it is impossible to compare curves (20) and (21) analytically, and therefore, I will set
values for the parameters similar to the competitive case.
Figure 2: Investment curves with parameters: γ = 0.5, r = 0.5, β = 0.18
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
For the given parameter values, on the eligible region for the analysis, capacity investment will
always be higher under zero rating (represented by the dashed line). However, looking at figure 6 in
appendix B, the opposite is true. By analysing figures 2, 6, 7 and 8, it is possible to see the effects
of network effect strength on incentives to invest described above.
Even though the monopoly case yields similar results, it is important to keep in mind that
increasing capacity always leads to higher fixed fees and therefore, net utility will remain con-
stant.This means that surplus from consumption increases with more capacity, but overall net utility
remains unchanged, leading to consumers being indifferent between levels of capacity. This is not
true in the competitive case, as only a fraction of the increase in surplus is captured by the firm.11
The remainder is kept by the consumers and translates into higher net utility and hence, higher
market share for the firm.
11This is evident in equation (11).
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VI Conclusion
Both the competitive and monopoly versions of the model analysed point to the same conclu-
sion: MNOs’ argument that zero rating increases investment incentives is not straightforward. In
fact, with low enough investment costs, joint billing will lead to higher capacity. While this goes
against previous literature where low costs were necessary to increase capacity under zero rating,
the overall conclusion that there is no clear increase in capacity when MNOs choose to zero rate
holds. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that while neither network effects nor price
discrimination (Inceoglu and Liu (2017)) is enough to sustain MNOs’ argument unconditionally,
there is no study that combines the two (or more) effects identified. Moreover it is not clear in
which direction should incentives go, that is, if for low investment costs, the increased incentives
from price discrimination outweigh the disincentives from network effects or vice-versa, and the
same for high investment costs.
In terms of regulatory needs, this paper and previous literature seem to point to the fact that there
is no clear argument pro or against zero rating in terms of total welfare. As such, regulatory agencies
should abstain from ex-ante regulation and analyse zero rating in a case by case framework.
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Letting b = R









3t+ Ak21 − Ak22 − 2b+ bγk2
6t− 4b+ bγk1 + bγk2
.
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−8A2k3 + (8A2K − 6γbA) k2 + (2γbAK + 12bA− 16At) k + (12AKt− 8bAK + γb2 − 2γbt)
6t+ 4k2A+ bγk − 4b
.
Joint Billing
Letting v = β









3t− 2v +Gk21 −Gk22 + 2rv − rvk2 + vγk2
6t− 4v + 4rv − rvk1 − rvk2 + vγk1 + vγk2
.














−3t+ 2v − 2rv − kvγ + krv
(−rv2 + v2γ − 8G2k3 + r2v2 − 6ct+ 4cv − 2tvγ
− 4Gck2 − rv2γ + 8G2Kk2 + 12GKt− 8GKv − 16Gkt+ 12Gkv − 4crv + 2rtv − ckvγ







Dashed lines represent investment under zero rating and solid lines represent investment under joint




Figure 3: Investment curves with parameters: γ = 0.5, r = 0.5, β = 1.5
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
Figure 4: Investment curves with parameters: γ = −0.5, r = 0.5, β = 1.5
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
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Figure 5: Investment curves with parameters: γ = −0.5, r = 0.5, β = 2.5
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
Monopoly case
Figure 6: Investment curves with parameters: γ = 0.5, r = 0.5, β = 0.7
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
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Figure 7: Investment curves with parameters: γ = −0.5, r = 0.5, β = 1.5
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
Figure 8: Investment curves with parameters: γ = −0.5, r = 0.5, β = 2.5
and t = 2; Dashed line: Zero-rating; Solid line: Joint billing
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